

05/14/1948 Press release announcing U.S. de facto recognition of the state of Israel.

This press release announcing de facto diplomatic recognition by the United States of the new state of Israel is in the papers of President Truman's press secretary, Charles Ross. It includes handwritten changes in the text, a notation of the time when it was released (only eleven minutes after the new nation was proclaimed), and the President's signature.

6. A person on Frank Moore's staff (preferably Cable who is quite extraordinary) should be designated as a contact point for the Jewish lobby. They should work with and through this person and this person alone. Hopefully, then we can avoid the introduction of destructive resolutions and amendments whose primary aim is to get our attention.

2 7. We should loosen up our people in State, Defense, CIA to speak to the various Jewish groups that are constantly in town. Remember, this is a very organized structure. Prominent members of many organization (including the Democratic Party and the National Finance Council) are simultaneously associated with the lobby. They could be massaged all during the process, not just at the end. I take it that they have had some problem getting appropriate speakers to explain our policies or at least answer some of their questions. This is dysfunctional to our ultimate goal.

2 Let us, above all, always remember who we are dealing with. They are the children of the Holocaust, those that bear the psychic scars of the mass murders, and for having survived. I am attaching an article that appeared in Esquire, of all places entitled "All the World Wants the Jews Dead". I want you to understand the depth of the paranoia. If they are insecure, they have good reason. We must reassure them, again and again and again. If we succeed, it will be the foreign policy cornerstone of Jimmy Carter's presidency, an achievement far more difficult and far more important in terms of the stability of a region and the world than even Richard Nixon's heralded opening with China. All the little things I suggest are not only necessary, but very much worth the trouble.

01/31/1949 Press release announcing U.S. de jure recognition of the state of Israel

This press release announces that the United States is now extending de jure diplomatic recognition to Israel, in the wake of recent elections for a permanent government in that country. The document bears President Truman's signature.

January 31, 1949

REVISED DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

On October 24, 1948, the President stated that when a permanent government was elected in Israel, it would promptly be given de jure recognition. Elections for such a government were held on January 25th. The votes have now been counted, and this Government has been officially informed of the results. The United States Government is therefore pleased to extend de jure recognition to the Government of Israel as of this date.

Approved Jan. 31, 1949
Harry S. Truman

Original Retained
for Preservation
R-500.1

A 1978 report by President Jimmy Carter's Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan concerning foreign policy, domestic policy, Jewish identity, Zionism and Israel.

I. Jewish Identity, Zionism and Israel

"If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand be severed from my body."

Distinctions that are often made between Jewishness and Zionism are seen by Jews as a rationalization for anti-semitism. For Jews, and certainly the great majority of American Jews, there is no distinction. Zionism, the movement on behalf of a permanent Jewish homeland in what was once Palestine, is the heart of all Jewish consciousness. It is borne out of 5,000 years of history, and in particular, as a reaction to the Holocaust. It is rooted in fear and distrust, enlightened paranoia, a sense of total and justified insecurity. For thousands of years Jews have been pursued or pitied. The modern Jew wants neither, and the existence of Israel is the key to psychic liberation.

The strong identification for Israel which I have referred to cross-cuts all socio-economic divisions in the Jewish community, and cross-cuts the three basic sects of American Judaism - Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. Reform Jews, the most liberal of the group, are as outspoken on the Israel question as the others. According to the Director of the Religious Action Center, a Reform Jewish political committee, "For American Jews, Israel is not a foreign policy issue, but a domestic issue." The identity, the sense of community, is so deeply rooted in American Jewry that it cannot be expected to dissipate. The response of American Jewry to crises in Israel, has been so staggering that it clearly manifests the root of the identification. "The reaction of American Jewry took the Israelis by surprise. It even amazed American-Jewish leaders. Why was the response so extreme? The obvious explanation is that American Jews wanted to protect Israel. True enough. But the response becomes more understandable if we proceed on the assumption that the desire on the part of the American Jews to protect Israel was also a desire to protect themselves -- that is, to protect their sense of meaning, their feeling of the worthwhileness of life, and of the rightness of being Jewish. In sum, if Israel were to be destroyed the American Jew would fall prey to anomie -- the breakdown of social norms and values. By acting as he did the American Jew was not only assisting his fellow Jews abroad; he was also protecting himself from the bottomless pit of anomie." (Marshall Sklare, America's Jews).

It may be impossible for a Gentile to fully understand the pride and also the fear that is inherent in being a Jew. I am enclosing a copy of essays on the Holocaust, written by survivors, which you and the President might skim in an attempt to understand the depth of the problem. When you read it, do not pity us, just try

to understand where our heads are coming from. Try to understand the psychic effects on a five year-old boy, me in this case, being told by his father, himself a victim of Russian pogroms, to try to accumulate jewelry and diamonds instead of bank accounts, because "when you have to run, you can only take what you can put in your pockets." The Jew grows up with a sense of distrust for all but fellow Jews. There is always the sense that when it comes down to it, you can only count on your own people. A Gentile can never tell a Jew what is best for him and for Israel. We have heard "final solutions" before.

Review QII. Jewish Participation in the Political Process ~~Voting~~

"Pray for the welfare of the government, since but for the awe thereof men would swallow each other alive." Rabbi Hanina, 1st Century, AD.

So much has been written about Jewish hyperactivity in politics, that there exists a whole body on this subject alone. Every book on voting behavior in America, from the classic The American Voter on, has isolated the extraordinary level of Jewish involvement in the political system. This hyperactivity can be traced to a number of correlates, including education and income. But the tradition goes back thousands of years, to places where Jews were a minute portion of the composition of a nation. This may be another manifestation of Jewish insecurity and fear -- the belief that to protect oneself, one has to become totally involved in national decision making. Milton Himmelfarb of the American Jewish Committee has written, "the zeal of untraditional Jews for politics is their de facto religion. With all they've gone through, those Jews are still messianic, and their religion is politics."

Studies have shown that between 10 and 20 percent of those actively involved in Democratic Party politics are Jewish. (Isaacs, Jews and American Politics.) The astounding level of high involvement has its own risks. Of the 20 people on Nixon's enemies list, seven of the first eight were Jews. Since a very great proportion of those actively involved in politics are highly educated and lawyers, it is not surprising that we find that fully 20% of America's lawyers have Jewish backgrounds, and that over 80% of Jewish children go on to college, and 45% go on to graduate degrees.

Although Jews comprise somewhat less than 3% of the Nation's population, they cast upwards of 4.5% of the votes in a Presidential election. Jewish turnout invariably registers 90% or more in all surveys. Participation in primary elections is even more disproportionate. In New York State, for example, where approximately 12% of the population is Jewish, Jews cast approximately 28% of the vote in Democratic state-wide primaries. In New York City, where the Jewish population is 20%, Jews cast over 55% of the vote in city-wide primaries.

Jewish voting is concentrated in ten strategic states: California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Illinois, Ohio and Michigan. Not only do Jews vote heavily, but they block vote, regardless of socio-economic status. Jews are the only voting group where religion, and not income or profession, is the best predictor of vote. Although wealthier Jews vote somewhat less Democratic than low income or middle income Jews, the difference is marginal. In presidential

elections, Democratic candidates can count on between 65% and 90% Jewish support (McGovern the low figure, Humphrey the higher figure, Carter at approximately 75% nationwide). Their impact on the electoral college is often decisive, and apparently was so in 1976. Caddell estimates that the Jewish block vote was decisive in Wisconsin (11 electoral votes), Ohio (25 electoral votes), New York (41 electoral votes), Pennsylvania (27 electoral votes) and Delaware (3 electoral votes), for a total of 107 electoral votes. Caddell estimates that in California, where our margin of defeat is now less than 40,000 votes, the loss can be attributed to a lower than national average Jewish Democratic vote (60% in California compared to 75% nationwide). If Jews had voted as heavily Democratic as their co-religionists in other states, Caddell estimates that we would have carried California and New Jersey, and possibly Virginia.

sub + population

The variance in turnout between Jews and other groups is staggering, and tends to inflate Jewish impact in the electoral process. New York is the best case in point. In New York, Jews and blacks comprise about the same percentage of the state population -- 2,150,000. It is estimated that approximately 35% of the black voting age population actually voted, compared to over 85% for the Jewish population. Thus, 525,000 blacks voted in New York state in the 1976 presidential election, while 1,275,000 Jews voted. With 94% of the black vote going for Carter, and 75% of the Jewish vote, the differential is 495,000 black Carter voters to 955,000 Jewish Carter voters, a difference of 2 to 1. You will recall that on election night, with about 70% of the vote in and Carter trailing Ford in New York by over 100,000 votes, you called me, with a bit of frantic in your voice, and demanded to know what the hell was going on. After a quick check on which counties were still out, I reported back that we had won New York by 250,000 votes -- the outstanding votes were from Kings County (Brooklyn) and Queens County (Queens). You questioned my estimate and I told you, "Hamilton, those are my people." I was not just speaking as a New Yorker -- by "my people" I meant that they were heavily Jewish. Carter-Mondale ended up carrying New York State by 271,000 votes.

New that we have demonstrated that Jews vote heavily, and heavily Democratic, let's make no mistake about the most salient voting issue for American Jews - Israel. To American Jews, the question of Israel is the most salient and determining voting issue, foreign or domestic. If ever there was a choice between a candidate who was perceived as pro-Israel running against a candidate who was perceived as anti-Israel, the Jewish vote would swing heavily behind their "friend". This is not predicated on party-identification. Heavy Democratic Jewish voting is founded in the immigrant tradition of second and third generation American Jews, and the socio-

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III. Jewish Participation in American Politics - Political Contributions

Nowhere is Jewish participation in American politics more obvious, and more disproportionate, than in the area of financial contributions to political candidates and political parties. But political contributions should not be isolated from charitable contributions in general, for therein lies the roots of Jewish political largesse. The Hebrew/Yiddish word which translates roughly as "charity" is not charity at all. "Seducah" means righteousness and social justice, not charity, and it is stressed from a Jewish child's first days in Sunday school. American Jewish political contributions pall by comparison to Jewish charitable contributions. It is estimated that in 1976, 3.6 billion dollars was raised by Jewish charitable institutions in the United States (there are over 800 separate Jewish charitable foundations, located in every state including Hawaii and Alaska). Some examples are illuminating. In 1972, the Israeli Bond Drive and the United Jewish Appeal realised over 600 million dollars. In the same year, the American National Red Cross raised 132 million dollars. In the first three days of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, over \$100 million was raised by American Jews; at the end of that 17-day war, over one billion dollars had been contributed. "Jews give like no other group in society." (Isaacs)

Jewish contributions in politics are even more disproportionate than their giving to charities. It is estimated that over 50% of the money in support of the Democratic Party over the last two decades has been Jewish money, principally from New York and California. The overlap of actors (those involved in Israeli-Jewish fundraising and party and candidate fundraising) is very high. The same people that are giving to the United Jewish Appeal in huge quantities are giving to Democratic candidates and the state and national Democratic parties. Even in Republican campaigns we find the overlap - Jewish Republican donors are very generous on their side of the street.

Here are some examples, based on estimates from the Finance Division of the Democratic National Committee, and several books on Jewish money in politics, on the extent of the Jewish influence in fundraising in political campaigns in America:

1976 Democratic National Committee

- 1) 1976 money raised from large donors....\$3,966,000.00
- 2) Out of 125 National Finance Council members 70 were Jewish
- 3) 56% of large donor money raised was from the Jewish community

1977 Democratic National Committee

- 1) 1977 money raised to date from large donors....
\$776,344.00
- 2) Out of 476 National Finance Council members 170 are Jewish
- 3) Jewish contributions to date total \$307,850.00;
so 40% of large donor money raised is from the Jewish community

Individual Races

- 1) Jackson Presidential (1976)
Total of 60,000 contributors
91% were Jewish contributors
- 2) Nixon Presidential (1972)
60% of the \$62 million was from Jewish contributors
(Sam Schulman contributed \$350,000)

Humphrey opposition raised \$3-4 million and 75% was Jewish
- 3) Humphrey Presidential (1968)
Total of 10.3 million dollars: \$4.9 million raised,
\$6.2 million borrowed
75% of contributions from Jewish community
- 4) McGovern Presidential (1972)
Total of \$30 million raised
Slightly over 50% from Jewish community
- 5) Bill Green Senate (1976)
\$1.4 million raised
30% from Jewish community
- 6) Pat Moynihan Senate (1976)
\$1.5 million raised
60% from Jewish community

- 7) Rizzo Mayor, Philadelphia, PA (1975)
 \$100,000 raised in general (50% from Jewish community)
 \$800,000 raised in primary (50% from Jewish community)
- 8) Tom Bradley Mayor, Los Angeles, CA (1973, 1977)
 60-70% Jewish contributors
- 9) Burt Pines, Los Angeles City Attorney (1973, 1977)
 Total of 1500 contributors
 70% Jewish contributors

Carter Campaign Primary

- 1) Pennsylvania
 Major contributors totaling 136 (56 from Jewish community)
 \$101,612.82 was raised (45% from Jewish community)
- 2) Florida
 Major contributors totaling 270 (87 Jewish)
 \$240,334.66 was raised (30% from Jewish community)
- 3) Illinois
 Major contributors totaling 325 (105 Jewish)
 \$229,087.50 was raised (35% from Jewish community)
- 4) California
 Major contributors totaling 448 (107 Jewish)
 \$392,325.88 was raised (25% from Jewish community)
- 5) New York
 Major contributors totaling 578 (305 Jewish)
 \$592,701.64 was raised (48% from Jewish community)

Let me restate -- wherever there is political fundraising, no matter what the community, there is major Jewish money. Bob Dole is especially sensitive to the small Jewish community in Kansas, because it is not so small in terms of his campaign contributions. Jewish money goes to candidates who are good on the question of Israel, wherever and whenever such candidates can be found. Jewish contributions extend to all elements of American life, public, political and private. Charity is a "Mitzvah" -- a good deed that is inherent in the definition of a good Jew. But the Mitzvah does indeed win friends, and the friends are all over this Nation, on the Hill and in every industry. As Rabbi Hillel said in the 11th century: "If I am not for myself, who will be for me? And if I am only for myself, then what am I? and if not now, when?"

V. Carter Commitments/Statements on Middle East and Israel

President Jimmy Carter, Press Conference, May 12, 1977:

"We have a special relationship with Israel. It is absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace. It is a special relationship. Although I have met with the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and had long hours of discussion, I never found any of those Arab leaders objecting to that special commitment of ours to the protection of the integrity of Israel. And, obviously, part of that is to make sure that Israel has adequate means to protect themselves without military involvement with the United States. I have no objection about this arrangement. I am proud of it. And it will be permanent as long as I am in office."

Because of the nature of the Democratic primary electorate, the President devoted considerable time, and made a number of very specific commitments, during the course of the nominating campaign on the question of Israel. During the general election campaign, he appeared before predominantly Jewish groups on several occasions, and restated those themes and commitments. The following represent Jimmy Carter's commitments to the people of the United States on his policies toward Israel and the Middle East, including the Middle East plank from the 1976 Democratic National Convention platform (which Stu Eisenstat approved, word for word, before it was adopted by the Platform Committee).

The National Democratic Platform 1976 - The Middle East

We shall continue to seek a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The cornerstone of our policy is a firm commitment to the independence and security of the State of Israel. This special relationship does not prejudice improved relations with other nations in the region. Real peace in the Middle East will permit Israel and her Arab neighbors to turn their energies to internal development, and will eliminate the threat of world conflict spreading from tensions there.

The Middle East conflict is complex, and a realistic, pragmatic approach is essential. Our policy must be based on firm adherence to these fundamental principles of Middle East policy:

We will continue our consistent support of Israel, including sufficient military and economic assistance to maintain Israel's deterrent strength in the region, and the maintenance of U.S. military forces in the Mediterranean adequate to deter military intervention by the Soviet Union.

We steadfastly oppose any move to isolate Israel in the international arena or suspend it from the United Nations or its constituent organizations.

We will avoid effort to impose on the region an externally devised formula for settlement, and will provide support for initiatives toward settlement, based on direct face-to-face negotiation between the parties and normalization of relations and a full peace within secure and defensible boundaries.

We vigorously support the free passage of shipping in the Middle East - especially in the Suez Canal.

We recognize that the solution to the problems of Arab and Jewish refugees must be among the factors taken into account in the course of continued progress toward peace. Such problems cannot be solved, however, by recognition of terrorist groups which refuse to acknowledge their adversary's right to exist, or groups which have no legitimate claim to represent the people for whom they purport to be speaking.

We support initiation of government enforcement action to insure that stated U.S. policy - in opposition to boycotts against friendly countries - is fully and vigorously implemented.

VI. The Concerns of the Jewish Community with respect to
Administration and Israel -- The Parameters of the Issues

Xenophobia is permeating the Jewish community: 1) fear of this unknown Baptist named Jimmy Carter who has no public record on Israel to reassure them; 2) intense fear and distrust of the State Department-Foreign Service-Defense Department career establishment; 3) fear of "quick fix" solutions to the problems of the Middle East and 4) fear of imposed settlements on Israel by the government of the United States. In light of this fear, let's dissect the issues and the specific concerns:

1. The question of borders: The President's statements during the campaign on the Golan Heights could not have been clearer, and they were music to the Jewish community's ears. "I would never ask Israel to return the Golan Heights to Syria. If I were them, I never would. I would never ask Israel to relinquish control of the Jewish and Christian holy places of East Jerusalem." Then in the President's early press conference he talked about "defensible" borders (more music to their ears). There is great confusion about where the President is heading on the issues -- what he considers strategic and what he considers defensible. To the Jewish community, there appear to be certain points that will be very difficult to negotiate on borders:

a) With respect to the Golan, anyone who has been there says it would be suicide for Israel to let Syria return to the Golan Heights overlooking the settlements in the valley below. How much buffer is probably negotiable, but the concept of buffer is not.

b) No Israeli government could possibly agree to, nor could the American Jewish community ever accept, the return of East Jerusalem to Jordan. Here there is room for negotiation, whether it is in guaranteed access, or non-political administration of an East Jerusalem borough.

c) The right of the Palestinian people to a "Palestinian" homeland -- I know you've heard the arguments, that the partition of 1947 established both a Jewish and a Palestinian homeland, with the Palestinians to be settled in what was once Transjordan. The Jewish community here is in almost morbid fear of a separate, politically independent Palestinian entity on the West Bank of the Jordan River. The fear and disgust of the PLO reaches almost Nazi-hating quality of emotion. The American Jewish community was therefore terribly concerned by the President's reference to a Palestinian homeland. Here, too, there is room for negotiation. American Jews may be persuaded that a Palestinian homeland as part of the nation of Jordan on the West Bank may be acceptable, if the West Bank is demilitarized, and

that ultimate political control of the West Bank Palestinian "borough" remains in the hands of Jordan (I believe there is genuine trust in Hussein.) This appears to be an attempt to control the PLO, which to the Jewish community is terrorism and death. It is also a check on the pro-Russian orientation of the PLO leadership. I would think that this solution would be acceptable to Jordan, but would meet great resistance in the rest of the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia.

d) The Jewish community probably would agree to the return of the Sinai if the area was demilitarized and if there was a defensible land corridor to Sharm el Sheik overlooking the Straits of Tiran. This would also include returning the Gaza Strip to Israel control, again as long as it was demilitarized.

On all of the above issues, the American Jewish community probably thinks the President will be influenced by the State and Defense Departments, whom the Jews absolutely don't trust.

2. The question of U.S. arms to Israel: The Jewish community was really hyped-up by the PRM on tiers of defense. It should be made clear again, and I know the President has said it before, that Israel's defense is a top priority to the United States, and that we will arm Israel sufficiently to meet their military needs. This issue is far more important than you might know. Israel, and the American Jewish community, believe that if there is some agreement and Israel withdraws to anything approaching the 1967 borders, the Arabs will hold back for a couple of years until they reach military parity with Israel, and then begin first a war of attrition and then an all-out strike. If Israel sees its military dominance in danger they would almost assuredly conduct a preemptive strike against its Arab neighbors, again sending the great powers on the verge of war. Israel must feel secure in its relationship with the United States with respect to armaments before it could consider a peace agreement demanding major territorial concessions on their part. The position on co-production, and the implementation of the 1975 agreement on advance weaponry, have thrown the question of reliance on U.S. weaponry into a gray area. We must always remember that since we can never agree to any treaty which commits troops to Israel in case of war, Israel's defense rests in their own hands. If they ever are unable to defend themselves, and if the Arabs attack and are on the verge of overrunning the State of Israel, Israel will not go down alone. I know the "Never Again" philosophy of the Jewish people. There is no question in my mind that an Israel in danger of being totally overrun will go down only after it uses everything in its power, including the 20 to 25 strategically deliverable nuclear warheads that our government is fully aware that the Israelis possess and have deployed.

Thus Israel must remain secure in its conventional arsenal, and the PRM 15 was very damaging in this regard. Delivery of advanced weaponry, per the 1975 agreement, must be an integral pre-condition of any major territorial concessions.

3. The Israelis remain skeptical about third party assurances: The Israelis, and the Jewish community in the United States, seem certain that the Sinai accords have not been faithfully adhered to. They cite (a) the building of a tunnel under the Suez Canal; (b) the installation of SAM sites on the East Bank of the Canal; (c) over-deployment of troops in the limited forces zone on the West Bank area of the Canal; (d) increased levels of Egyptian propaganda which contravenes the agreement; (e) failure of Egypt to live by its pledge to the United States that it would not take an active role in removing Israel from international agreements and passing anti-Israel resolutions in International organizations (the UN Zionist is Racism resolution was passed with strong support from Egypt, as was the UNESCO ouster); (f) Egyptian ambassadrial obstructions of Israeli initiatives on diplomatic relations with black Africa (contravening Egyptian assurances to the United States that they would not stand in the way of such diplomatic overtures); (g) failure of the United States to live up to the 1975 agreement with Israel on advanced weaponry. The failure of the United States to even refer to these violations make the Israelis somewhat skeptical on U.S. assurances about guaranteeing the peace once an agreement is reached.

4. The American Jewish community has always distrusted the careerists at the State Department and Defense Department, who they believe are truly committed to General Brown's notion that Israel is a burden and liability in world affairs. They refer to these careerists as suffering from the "petro-diplomatic complex". The great fear among Jews is that the President will not be exposed to other voices than these, and they feel that they have no way currently to relate to either in the White House, the National Security Council or State, that will even be moderately sympathetic to their views.

5. The ultimate fear is of an imposed settlement by the United States, action contrary to the President's commitments and the Democratic Party Platform. President Carter's comments to European journalists that "I would not hesitate if I saw clearly a fair and equitable solution to use the full strength of our own country and its persuasive powers to bring those nations to agreement," aggravated the fear. They must be made to believe that a settlement is in their own best interests, and they must have some power to independently determine their interests from what the United States thinks is their interests.

6. There is a lot of what the President says that is very well received, especially in his definition of peace. They are most pleased about open borders and free trade. They believe that economic interdependence will ease the likelihood of war, and also teach people on both sides to get along civilly. These are points the President should continue to publicly stress.

All things considered, I think there is a feeling that true peace could be attained. But their fear is that the agreement will require Israel to withdraw to indefensible borders before the Arabs must implement the other areas of the treaty. Remember, Hamilton, these people are really scared. They have no confidence in anyone or anything other than themselves. They've been screwed too often to be very trusting, even of us.

VII. A Structural Prelude to a Settlement -- Easing of Tension, Opening up Communication

After giving this issue a lot of thought after our Friday talk, I have reached some tentative conclusions on where we go from here. Take them for whatever they're worth.

1. It is not enough for the Jewish community to be brought in to be sold. They have to be made to have a sense of what might happen, to be a sounding board for opinion.


2. In dealing with a strong but paranoid lobby, surprise is the worst form of communication. Surprises will trigger outrage, cries of sell-out, and the fullest use of the power of the lobby.

3. Some sense of countervailing sources of opinion must be restored to the State Department and the Defense Department.
4. We cannot proceed successfully if the feeling in the Jewish community that the State and Defense Departments are populated with anti-semitic Arabists is allowed to remain unchallenged.
5. A token of "objectivity" must be introduced into the departments, even if it is the placement of one obviously sympathetic, non-career person, in each. At the very least, this will give the lobby someone to bitch to that they feel will at least listen.


4. The sense that the White House is indifferent to their views must be attacked. They feel that they have no one here who is sympathetic and informed on the issue. Both Lipshutz and Eizenstat are seen to be busy with their own primary areas of concern and there is some feeling that Bob does not fully comprehend the issues involved. Bill Quant in NSC is suspected to be an Arabist, and David Aarons is not really thought to be committed. Someone should be added to the staff, preferably in NSC, whose primary responsibility would be the Middle East settlement, and who appears to be remotely sympathetic to the Israeli (and implicitly American Jewish) cause.

5. Once a person is designated in the White House, the Washington representatives of the Jewish groups should be brought in to discuss the situation and the issues. In the negative, these people can trigger a heavy lobbying effort from the field, but in a positive way they would really help us, or at least caution us on big mistakes. Above all, they must come to feel that their voices have been heard and that they have been part of the process. Only then could they be called on to help sell the result to their people and the Hill.

This Government has been informed that a Jewish
state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition
has been requested by the ^{provisional} Government thereof.

The United States recognizes the provisional gov-
ernment as the de facto authority of the new ^{State} ~~Jewish~~ 

~~state.~~ Israel



Approved
May 14, 1948.

6.11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 26, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 231

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE
CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Middle Eastern Nuclear Capabilities

The President desires, as a matter of urgency, that we undertake every feasible measure to improve our intelligence on the Israeli nuclear program as well as other Israeli and UAR advanced weapon programs, and to arrive at a firmer evaluation of their import. In this connection he wishes the next informal inspection of the Israeli reactor complex to be undertaken promptly and to be as thorough as possible.

In view of his great concern over the destabilizing impact of any Israeli or UAR program looking toward the development of nuclear weapons, the President also wishes the Department of State to develop proposals for forestalling such programs; in particular we should develop plans for seeking clearer assurances from the governments concerned on this point, and means of impressing upon them how seriously such a development would be regarded in this country.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

cc:

Mr. Bundy
Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Komer
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

~~TOP SECRET~~

Col. Cole, DIA 4/12/62
Thermon, Mr. Reagan 4/16/63
Parrott 4/2

CIA (Mr. Cooper) Dispatched 3/26/63

authorized to give copy to Ben Bako, USA per request of Bente;
Dane Cooper (4/11)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

MR-95-145 Apr 1991

By: [Signature] NARA, LSW:11/14/97

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(133)

Memorandum of Conversation

DEPARTMENT OF STATE: A/CDC/MP

REVIEWED by EG Kovach DATE 3/13/91

DATE: December 1, 1960

SUBJECT:

() RELEASE (X) DECLASSIFY
 (X) EXCISE () DECLASSIFY IN PART
 () DENY () Non-responsive info.
 FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(6)

TS authority to:

PARTICIPANTS:

(X) DOWNGRADE TS to () S of () C, OADR
 James Meem, ICA
 Philip J. Farley, S/AE

December 7 1960

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S/P - Mr. Smith

RA - Mr. Fessenden

Embassy Paris - Mr. Isenberg

Embassy Tel Aviv

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[] came in at Mr. Farley's request to discuss his recent visit to Israel.

[] Mr. Farley said that the Department had received messages indicating that [] had made observations concerning sensitive information which he wished to communicate concerning the Israeli project.

[] said that the Israeli had been constructing a large installation in the Negev south of Beersheba and referred to it as a large agricultural experimental station. He was convinced that this was actually a Marcoule-type reactor being constructed with French technical assistance. He gave a number of reasons for this conviction:

1. He was shown a photograph of the installation in our Embassy at Tel Aviv which apparently included a steel containment sphere which would be usable only for a nuclear power reactor. The general characteristics of the installation were those of the Marcoule reactor.
2. In his visit to the Technion at Haifa he had found that it was not practical for him to discuss Israeli personnel

SECRET

FILED

In the absence of a positive mandate to inspect with all that word implies, the team has felt constrained to accept the ground rules made evident by their host, leading to the present situation in which a "visit" is conducted rather than an "inspection." The team therefore did not make an issue of the fact that the program drawn up by Israel shifted timing and focus in important ways which limited their access to key facilities. Nor did they take issue with their host's obvious pushing and hurrying past points at which they indicated a desire for a closer look. The fact that the team avoided creating issues can give rise to the semantic interpretation that what went on satisfied them, which is in essence what the Israelis replied to the Embassy. There is no doubt whatever in the mind of the chief of the team but that his hosts effectively tailored the occasion as a "visit" to suit their own purposes: they took great care to emphasize at the outset that it was a visit and nothing more, and obviously relied on the good manners and restraint of the team members to avoid challenges of substance.

COMMENT

It is clear to me from the discussion that visits conducted under these approaches may even be counter-productive, leaving Israel in the position of pointing them out as evidence of "cooperation" or "US satisfaction" at some key juncture in the future. It also seems to me that we have within our own purview the ability to make the occasions more meaningful by instructing the team to take a positive approach to inspection, asking for all the access and information they deem required, and leaving it to the Israelis either to accede or make positive denials of what is requested. At the least, that course would place responsibility where it must rest rather than avoiding the real issues in a manner which prejudices our interests.

cc: NEA - Mr. Davies
INR - Mr. Hughes
AEC - Dr. Reichardt

INCOMING AIRGRAM

Department of State

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Action

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 213 OF 11 PAGES

Classification

INR

Info

FROM: AmbEmbassy PARIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Date Sent

November 22, 1960

SS

TO: SecState WASHINGTON

REVIEWED BY

EG Kennedy

G

SP

NO: G-766

☒ RELEASE☒ DECLASSIFY

C

☐ EXCISE☐ DECLASSIFY

L

☐ DENY☐ Non-responsive info.

H

RPTD INFO: TEL AVIV: G-8

POL. INFO. EXCISE

G-9

EUR

☐ CLASSIFY as

TS authority to:

NEA

☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S of ☐ C, OADR

IO

Washington please pass A. A. Wells, AEC. Reference CA 3636, October 19, 1960. In response to referenced despatch, the following information is supplied.

SAE ✓

The subject of French participation in the alleged construction of a nuclear power plant in Beersheba, Israel, was discussed frankly with an appropriate member of the French Atomic Energy Commission. This individual stated flatly that the French CEA is not collaborating with the Israeli Government in the construction of a nuclear power reactor. Furthermore he said that no French company is working with the Israelis on a power reactor since prior permission from the CEA would be required and such permission has neither been requested nor granted.

SSA

E

UMSC

UIGC

ICA ✓

CIA ✓

NSA

AEC ✓

COM

Regarding the French-Israeli agreement, this does not extend to assistance in the field of power reactors. The agreement relates to (1) collaboration in the field of heavy water production (there is also U. K. participation on this matter), and (2) production of uranium from phosphate deposits. The Franco-Israeli agreement is not a Government-to-Government agreement, but rather an agreement between the two Atomic Energy Commissions. Accordingly, the agreement is considered as an "internal document" and copies of the agreement are not available.

RMR

Additional information was received from an American representative of a U. S. concern which designs and builds nuclear reactors. He returned from Israel about 2 1/2 months ago. This individual states that the Israeli Government is not now constructing a power reactor in Israel. He added, however, that Dr. Bergmann of the Israeli AEC is interested in working out an arrangement with an American concern in the joint development of a power reactor project.

HOUGHTON

Drafted by:

AEC/P: JKRoulean, 11/22/60

Authenticated by:

POL: RAKidder, 11/22/60

CONFIDENTIAL

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Action

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EXCISE

AEC

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOV 26 1960

Info

FROM: Paris

REVIEWED by EG K... DATE 12/1/60

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2162, November 26, 1960

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EXEMPTIONS

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SAE

SENT DEPARTMENT 2162; REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 29

INR

PASS WELLS, AEC, FROM ROULEAU

RMR

Further Embassy telegram 2138 dated 25 November.

[] returning from Israel stopped Paris. Explained he had "urgent and secret" item regarding Israeli nuclear power reactor but not sure to whom he should reveal information. Failing in attempt obtain information for onward transmission, since [] apparently wished disclose information higher level, I urged stop in Washington and discuss with you. Claimed this impossible. Stated he had been "held with tongs" and Embassy Tel Aviv though apparently learned of substance CA-3636 while there. Claims personal friend Ben Gurion told him one week ago that within three weeks Israel would announce five year plan (?) simultaneously revealing construction nuclear power plant vicinity of Beersheba. Admitted uncertainty timing of announcement though no question existence facility. Stated except for official status his presence in Israel would have visited site. Parried questions as to power rating and completion date, but said France providing assistance. With reference French denial participation Israeli project commented that "France intends to do everything to regain place as major power". Lack of details precludes evaluation importance [] information. However, implied France will supply natural uranium for large nuclear power plant and has aided in design and construction, apparently without consideration IAEA or EURATOM implications.

AN:BLB-14

HOUGHTON

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Hold for JJS
DATE: August 13, 1969
8/13/69

SUBJECT: 1969 Dimona Visit

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, Director of Intelligence, AEC
Mr. Charles A. Sommer, Deputy Director of Intelligence, AEC
Mr. George B. Pleat, Chief of Dimona Inspection Team
Robert H. Munn, NEA/IAI

The substantive portion of Tel Aviv's 3055 of August 8 was made available to the AEC officers for their comment. Their general feeling is that it would be pointless to engage in debate with the Israelis on the details of whether or not the team's requirements were actually met, since Ambassador Barbour has already made the substantive points outlined in State 124641 in his discussion with the Prime Minister (Tel Aviv 2941 of July 31). The AEC officers had not seen this cable but were apprised of its content. They concur that it would be useful to record a reply to the Israeli description of the "visit" by reaffirming the views expressed by Ambassador Barbour.

Dr. Reichardt will send the Department general comments on the situation in a covering memorandum to be forwarded with copies of the Dimona Inspection Report, which will be forthcoming within a few days. He dictated a draft in my presence. The following will, however, add to his very diplomatic language.

In response to my question of how the frame of reference or guidance for the US team is formulated, the AEC officers reviewed briefly the history of the inspections. From a number of sources, the team has drawn the inference that the US government is not prepared to support a real "inspection" effort in which the team members can feel authorized to ask directly pertinent questions and/or insist on being allowed to look at records, logs, materials and the like. The team has in many subtle ways been cautioned to avoid controversy, "be gentlemen" and not take issue with the obvious will of the hosts. On one occasion it seems that the team was criticized roundly by the Israelis for having "acted like inspectors" and the criticism was passed on rather than refuted.

NEA/IAI:RHMunn:hml
8/13/69 x22030

(Drafting Office and Officer)

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training plans on the basis of any consistent explanation of Israeli personnel requirements for their program in the next few years. The Israeli had a clear requirement for personnel of specific types which could not be used in any program they would identify. Furthermore, their familiarization program was much more detailed and operational in its nature than was called for by their research activities. A number of trained people had recently been put to work but were not apparent in any known installation.

3. At Rahoboth he visited both the Weizmann institute and a facility called Plant or Laboratory No. 4. It was apparent that the people he talked to had been thoroughly briefed to restrict their discussion within security bounds. Nevertheless, it was apparent that work was under way under way which he was not shown or advised of. One man distressed his guide by mentioning that Plant No. 4 expected to be working with gram quantities of plutonium and curie quantities of polonium in a short time; such material would not come from any existing Israeli facility and presumably would come from either France or the new large reactor. One professor at the Institute told [] that he had been shown detailed specifications without explanation as to the facility to which they related and asked to translate and explain the French legends; the specifications were clearly for a nuclear power reactor. (b)(6)
4. There is an existing French-Israeli atomic energy co-operation agreement and many of the key figures in the Israeli program have been trained at Saclay or other French establishments.
5. In his final meeting with Dr. Bergman, Chairman of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, [] taxed him with conducting activities which were not freely discussed. Bergman acknowledged that this was so, particularly with regard to the Beersheba installation, and said that it had originally been intended to make a public statement about a year from now but as a result of the amount of rumors which was now going around it was planned that Ben Gurion would make a statement about three weeks hence (i.e., about two weeks from the date of this memorandum). (b)(6)